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Central bank digital currency (CBDC) is emerging as the future of banking and payments. We 
analyze CBDCs’ benefits to consumers and the economy and some concerns associated with 
their use. 
 




The current trend of central bank activities clearly shows that central bank digital currency 
(CBDC) is likely to be the future of banking and payments. In late 2020, the international 
financial institution owned by central banks, Bank for International Settlements (BIS), surveyed 
more than 60 central banks about their engagement in digital versions of fiat currency work and 
found that 86% were exploring CBDCs.1 In October 2020, Central Bank of the Bahamas (CBB) 
launched the digital Bahamian Dollar (B$), known as “the sand dollar,” which was the world’s 
first CBDC.2 Parties transacting in the sand dollar benefit from the legal-tender status since it 
uses a liability of the CBB, which is viewed as the safest form of payment in the country. 
 
Major world economies such as Brazil, China, the Eurozone, Japan, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States are undergoing various phases of research exploration and trial 
of CBDCs.3 CBDCs utilize different models and widely differ in terms of factors such as target 
users and the types of technologies used. China’s digital yuan, or e-CNY, for instance, is being 
tested for retail use by the public. Other economies, such as Hong Kong4 and Australia, are 
developing CBDCs targeted at financial institutions. In November 2020, Australia’s central bank 
and banknote-issuing authority, the Reserve Bank of Australia, announced a partnership with 
multinational bank Commonwealth Bank of Australia, another bank serving Australia National 
Australia Bank, investment and trustee group Perpetual, and blockchain company ConsenSys to 
explore the potential use and implications of a wholesale form of distributed ledger technology 
(DLT)-based CBDC. The project’s goal was to develop a proof-of-concept (PoC) based on an 
Ethereum-based platform for issuing a tokenized form of CBDC for the wholesale market, which 
involves borrowing and lending among institutional banks.5 
 
Ripple, which is a semicentralized system,6 is also being viewed as a platform for developing, 
issuing, and managing CBDCs. Quoting a report of the professional accounting body, CPA 
Australia, media outlets reported that France’s central bank, the Banque de France, has shown 
interest in exploring Ripple as a platform for issuing its CBDC.7 
 
In November 2020, the central banks of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
concluded a joint CBDC PoC, referred to as the “Aber” project. The project was launched in 
January 2019.8 The goal was to test the viability of a shared digital currency between the two 
countries. The project used Hyperledger Fabric, which is a permissioned blockchain associated 
with Linux Foundation and IBM. In addition to the two central banks, six local commercial 
banks participated to run the nodes.9 A key finding was that, compared to centralized payment 
systems, the use of DLT can improve domestic and cross-border commercial bank 
settlements.10 The Aber project built on earlier trials conducted in other countries, such as 
Singapore’s Project Ubin and Canada’s Project Jasper.11 
 
Benefits to Consumers and the Economy 
 
Some of the key potential benefits of CBDCs vis-à-vis fiat currencies and other payment systems 
are presented in Table 1. They are also illustrated in the case of e-CNY, also commonly referred 
to by its original project name, Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP), which is in the 
most advanced stage of development among CBDC projects of major economies. 
 
Table 1. The key benefits of CBDC to consumers and the national economy. 
Benefit Explanation The case of DCEP/e-CNY 
Reliable low-risk 
payment solution 
• There are more reliable means to carry out payment 
settlements compared to other available means. 
• Private companies such as Alipay and 
WeChat Pay face risks such as 
business failure and bankruptcy. 
Low costs and high 
efficiency 
• There are faster transactions at lower costs • It is likely to be free for vendors to 





• For a digital wallet linked to the CBDC account 
through application programming interfaces, no 
account in a bank is needed to engage in transactions.  
• Traceability and the possibility of conducting 
transactions without a smartphone can promote 
financial inclusion of disadvantaged groups. 
• People’s Bank of China can monitor 
the flow of money and deliver targeted 
programs to improve the well-being of 
high-risk/disadvantaged groups.  
• The December 2020 Suzhou trial 




• They are more traceable than fiat currencies and 
other payment systems for the government.  
• Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies employ 
cryptography.  
• Blockchains are likely to be permissioned, which is 
another defense layer. 
• It is described as “controllable 
anonymity” and is expected to control 
money laundering, terrorism 
financing, and tax evasion.  
• It employs asymmetric cryptography. 
 
It is worth noting that the relative importance of different benefits varies across economies. A 
BIS survey of 63 central banks [41 in emerging market economies (EMEs) and 22 in advanced 
economies] found that EMEs value domestic payments’ efficiency and financial inclusion as the 
top two benefits of CBDCs. On one hand, cross-border payments’ efficiency was the least 
important benefit for EMEs. Central banks in advanced economies, on the other hand, viewed 
payments’ safety and financial stability as CBDCs’ primary benefits. Financial inclusion was 
considered to be the least important factor by this group.12 
 
Reliable Low-Risk Payment Solution 
 
A state-backed digital currency is the most reliable means to carry out payment settlements. In a 
CBDC transaction, just like in an exchange of banknotes, as soon as the possession changes, a 
final settlement is reached between the parties. With transactions, such as cashless payments by 
credit card, wire, check, and digital apps, a deal is not fully settled when one party makes a 
payment to another. That is, until the banks have recorded, reconciled, and settled their 
respective debits and credits, there is a possibility that the transaction could be reversed.13 In 
China, for instance, Alipay and WeChat Pay rely on commercial banks to settle 
payments.14 Parties that rely on private companies such as Alipay and WeChat Pay face risks, 
such as business failure and bankruptcy of companies in payment ecosystems. 
 
Low Costs and High Efficiency 
 
Parties in a transaction may achieve high efficiency and low costs with CBDCs. Eliminating 
intermediaries could be a key mechanism to reduce transaction costs. The vendors are required to 
pay a service fee when consumers use e-payment systems such as WeChat Pay and Alipay or 
credit cards. In China, the fee is usually 0.6% of the total amount.15 The Chinese government has 
indicated that it will be free for vendors to accept e-CNY payments. 
 
In Table 2, we compare the throughputs of some major payment systems in terms of transactions 
per second (TPS). Specifically, this table compares the throughputs of China’s DCEP, Ripple 
(being considered by the Banque de France), Hyperledger Fabric (used by the Aber project of the 
central banks of Saudi Arabia and the UAE), and Ethereum (used to develop a PoC by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia) with some other crypto and noncrypto payment solutions. 
 
Table 2. The efficiency and performance indicators of some major payment systems.29,30 
Payment system TPS Remarks 
DCEP About 220,000 December 2019, peak TPS31 
Ripple Average: 1,50032 CBDC private ledger: Ripple claimed that it can handle tens of 
thousands of TPS in the initial phase, which can be increased to 
hundreds of thousands of TPS over time 
Bitcoin Average: 5.15 Complete decentralization has reduced performance 
Ethereum Average: 20 Ethereum 2.0 has an expected 100,000 TPS 
Hyperledger Fabric Average: 3,500 Deployed in a single cloud data center (early 2018) 
Visa Average: 1,700 Can handle more at peak load 
Diem Average: about 3 
(January 2021)33 
In the testing phase, testnet  
Original Libra white paper envisioned 1,000 TPS34 
 
The CBDCs being planned by major economies are expected to perform well in terms of 
throughput (Table 2). China’s DCEP is expected to potentially have much higher transaction 
processing rates than other CBDCs. Ripple’s CBDC Private Ledger, which is built for issuing 
currencies, uses the same technology that has powered the ledger for its digital currency, 
XRP.16 The firm reported that it is in discussion with central banks worldwide to assess how its 
CBDC private ledger can be used to issue digital currency. As to the mechanisms needed for 
various CBDCs to interact, Ripple has advocated for the use of its cryptocurrency XRP as a 
bridge or a vehicle to efficiently move from the value from one CBDC to another in a frictionless 
manner.17 Likewise, Ethereum is currently in the process of upgrading to Ethereum 2.0, which is 
expected to increase speeds to 100,000 TPS.18 
 
Promoting the Financial Inclusion of Disadvantaged Groups 
 
In the current system, checking and savings accounts with financial institutions are the primary 
means to gaining access to credit. In developing economies, financial institutions are not easily 
accessible. Opening a bank account in developing as well as developed countries may involve a 
number of barriers, such as formal identification, a minimum deposit and balance, and a local 
bank branch.19 
 
Commercial banks often find it unprofitable to serve poor people and small businesses in remote 
and marginalized regions. Moreover, if the majority of consumers start using electronic and 
digital payments, such as online/mobile payments and digital wallets, the infrastructure for cash 
payments may suffer, and cash might no longer be an option in these regions. Such a situation 
might lead to further marginalization of the poor. 
 
The International Monetary Fund argues that digital currency offers great promise to reaching 
disadvantaged groups.20 A retail CBDC system, in which a central bank issues digital currency 
directly to people without the need for traditional bank accounts, can address many of the 
previous challenges. This can be achieved through the establishment of an inclusive digital 
payment ecosystem and the creation of financial data identities. For instance, individuals can 
have a CBDC account on the central bank’s ledger. A digital wallet application linked to the 
CBDC account through application programming interfaces can allow users to access their 
accounts and engage in transactions.19 
 
CBDCs can thus promote financial inclusion of low-income groups and small and medium 
enterprises.6 For instance, since e-CNY is highly traceable, the central bank, PBoC, can monitor 
the flow of money in the Chinese economy.15 This allows the government to deliver targeted 
programs to improve the well-being of high-risk and disadvantaged groups, such as small 
businesses and low-income households. 
 
Viewed from the perspective of the rural low-income population, the trial conducted in 
December 2020 in city of Suzhou in the Jiangsu Province in eastern China deserves mentioning. 
The trial involved e-CNY’s offline payments without smartphones. It explored mechanisms that 
allow the completion of transactions by touching two devices via near-field communication 
(NFC). Since one-third of China’s population lacks Internet access, this trial is important to 
understanding the opportunity of expanding e-CNY in rural China. 
 
Combating Economic Crimes and Frauds 
 
Compared to a fiat currency, digital currencies are difficult to counterfeit.21 CBDCs that are 
supported with blockchain employ complex cryptography to prevent double spending. This is the 
digital equivalent of preventing the making of an identical copy of a banknote. Blockchains used 
for CBDCs are likely to be permissioned, which restricts the access to only authorized users, 
providing another layer of defense.22 
 
While China’s DCEP does not necessarily use blockchain, it employs asymmetric cryptography 
to enhance security.23 The PBoC has stated that transaction records are encrypted, and 
unauthorized parties cannot access them. 
 
Governments are also likely to use CBDCs to combat economic crimes. At a BIS seminar, the 
director-general of the PBoC’s digital currency institute Mu Changchun proposed global rules, 
which emphasize the importance of synchronizing the flows of information and funds so that 
regulators can monitor the compliance of transactions.24 A PBoC official noted that the DCEP’s 
“controllable anonymity,” rather than full anonymity, is based on international consensus to 
satisfy antimoney laundering, antiterrorism financing, and antitax-evasion requirements.25 By 
tracking and recording the details of all transactions, the government is in a better position to 
prevent and control illegal transactions. 
 
Privacy Violation and Surveillance-Related Concerns 
 
While the aforementioned benefits are attractive, CBDCs may also present some risks to 
consumers. Privacy is among the biggest concerns that critics have about CBDCs. From the 
privacy standpoint, there are at least three issues that need to be considered. First, CBDC 
transactions are not likely to be fully anonymous. Making data anonymous means preventing the 
identification of parties engaged in a transaction using special techniques. CBDCs, such as the 
DCEP, and decentralized cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, differ in terms of who is intended to 
be prevented from identifying the parties in a transaction. For instance, both parties in a 
transaction involving DCEP can be anonymous to the public. DCEP thus provides a higher 
degree of anonymity when it comes to the ability of parties other than the Chinese government to 
identify the participants in a transaction. DCEP transactions, however, can be monitored by the 
PBoC. The e-CNY has users’ personal information and other details to track and record every 
movement, such as where it is stored and how it is spent. 
 
Second, when users’ financial information is centralized, it can potentially be misused by the 
government. Such information is also likely to be targeted by cybercriminals.26 
 
Third, there is a possibility that consumer data are shared with third parties. In a 2020 report on 
CBDC, published by the central banks of the United States, Europe, England, Japan, 
Switzerland, Canada, and Sweden, and the BIS,27 there was discussion of the possibility of 
allowing service providers to access consumer data, and to charge them a fee would be a way to 
cover the cost of a CBDC system. In China, e-CNY is expected to provide commercial banks 
with rich transaction data to profile a larger number of consumers and analyze their online 
behavior. They can thus experiment with different ways to monetize consumer data.28 
 
While CBDCs’ benefits such as the low cost of producing and storing, ease of use, and 
protection against counterfeiting are obvious, they can also reduce transaction costs by removing 
third-party intermediaries such as commercial banks. They can address various barriers to 
financial inclusion. CBDCs can also be issued in a pro-poor manner. For instance, consumers 
involved in an e-CNY trial completed transactions with NFC technology, which did not require 
an Internet connection. The possibility of using DCEP with NFC is especially attractive for 
individuals and organizations in remote areas who lack Internet access or bank accounts. 
Countries that have created financial data identities can ensure higher efficiency and value 
addition from CBDC efforts. 
 
CBDCs may adversely affect the businesses of financial and payment intermediaries, such as 
mobile and online payment platforms, banks, and microfinance institutions. In China, for 
instance, e-CNY may pose a direct challenge to the existing payment systems, such as WeChat 
Pay and Alipay. 
 
From the consumers’ standpoint, a downside of CBDCs is that the government is likely to track 
all transactions. Privacy concerns are even more salient in authoritarian regimes, given their aim 
of maintaining social control at all costs. For instance, among key driving forces in the 
development of the DCEP is, arguably, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) desire of social 
control. The CCP has regarded its centralized banking system as a key instrument of its 
economic power. By putting every transaction onto the PBoC’s radar, the DCEP may strengthen 
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